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From 2011 until 2014, BICC worked with the government of South Sudan to  
improve the management of state-owned arms and ammunition. Arms and  
ammunition management is still weak, with dilapidated infrastructure,  
untrained staff, and lack of clear and unified rules and regulations. The situation 
is further complicated by limited institutional capacity to instigate and manage 
change initiatives, as well as a lack of clarity over which government institution 
is supposed to drive change. Although awareness had increased and numerous 
positive developments had started, the situation has again deteriorated with the 
outbreak of hostilities in December 2013 and the subsequent large-scale prolif-
eration of small arms. This report evaluates the project results, and tries to draw 
lessons for interventions on arms control in the future, not only in South Sudan 
but also in other countries. 
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The difficulties related to improving arms man-
agement, also known as physical security and stock-
pile management (PSSm) are not unique to South  
Sudan—although the country does present an especial-
ly difficult environment. PSSm borrows from differ-
ent concepts such as ammunition management, 
armed violence reduction (AvR) and security sector 
reform (SSR). As such it can form part of attempts to 
professionalise the armed forces, make peoples’ im-
mediate surroundings safer or more secure, improve 
relations between communities and local security 
providers, strengthen criminal justice mechanisms, 
or even improve a country’s operational capacity and 
readiness to fight wars. The question of what “doing 
PSSm” entails in a particular situation can cause con-
siderable confusion and lead to turf battles between 
different institutions who claim to be working to 
achieve the same goal (“better PSSm practices”). Dif-
ferent projects can aim at different outcomes, but 
strong co-ordination and allocation of responsibilities 
is paramount, as well as a mutual understanding of 
what the different partners want to achieve and why 
they agree to a PSSm programme in the first place. 
South Sudan has seen this mixture of motives at 
the level of government and that of international 
partners. A large-scale, internationally supported PSSm 
programme has not yet taken off, although numerous 
projects did start prior to the outbreak of violent con-
flict in 2013. These have included drafting of legislation, 
construction of storage facilities, and marking and 
registration of weapons. They have been moderately 
successful in that they have helped to raise awareness 
and build up networks within the organised security 
forces of South Sudan.
The current situation has undermined much of 
the progress that has been made. A large-scale PSSm 
programme is now unlikely to start given the current 
security situation in South Sudan, as well as the lack 
of a clear indication of the political direction of the 
country. However, arms and ammunition management 
remains a major concern in the country, and once 
some sort of stability has returned, certain activities 
urgently require attention from the government—in 
all likelihood with support from the international 
community. The following is a short description of 
the main findings of this Working Paper.
Arms control is seen too much  
in isolation
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons 
(SALw) is a pervasive problem that aggravates existing 
social tensions in South Sudan. Government security 
services have difficulties controlling large parts of the 
territory, and SALw control programmes (particularly 
disarmament) are therefore seen as a way to improve 
the ability of the government to exercise control over 
rural parts of the country. To many South Sudanese 
government representatives the main function of 
PSSm is to decrease the risk of theft from government 
stockpiles. Although donors and their implementing 
agencies (NGOs, private contractors) understand the 
importance of decreasing the risk of theft, they usually 
have additional motivations to engage in PSSm, such 
as to improve safety for the civilian population, or to 
support their efforts to improve community security 
by increasing police accountability. Such differing 
motivations are quite common and can be overcome, 
as long as both sides are aware of the other party’s 
intentions. 
However, what seems absent from the debate in 
South Sudan on the control of government-owned 
and civilian weapons is first of all the question why 
people would want to own a firearm, and second why 
weapons disappear from government stocks in the 
first place. Although criminal intentions clearly play 
a role, and even though the distinction between of-
fensive and defensive use of guns is rather blurred in 
practice, the reason why many South Sudanese will 
want to own a gun is that they don’t feel sufficiently 
protected by the state. This is why some previous dis-
armament operations proved to have such disastrous 
effects: Entire communities were left without weapons 
but also without protection against their still armed 
neighbours. These communities will now do every-
thing they can to hold on to their weapons.
The other side of the arms control coin is that the 
state’s absence in rural areas currently provides op-
portunities for gun owners to profit from them. weak 
accountability and links between security providers 
and local communities mean that government repre-
sentatives are sometimes directly involved in the  
diversion of government arms to local communities. 
Main findings
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This can be either for political (support to one’s ethnic 
group) or criminal motives (“renting out” one’s 
weapon for the night). Setting up a good PSSm system 
within the different security services of South Sudan 
means first of all improving central control over stocks, 
and strengthening accountability. Second it entails 
removing peoples’ motives for owning a weapon in 
the first place.  
Current limits in capacity also limit  
the build-up of future capacity
There is limited administrative capacity within 
the South Sudanese security services to manage arms 
and ammunition. There have been efforts to bring 
management structures up to standard, but a large 
number of specific tasks such as the drafting of 
standard operating procedures (SOPs), training of store-
keepers, or the inspection of storage facilities have 
not been assigned to dedicated units or individuals. 
In general the bureaucratic capacity and willingness 
to implement a basic regulatory framework (including 
training, procedures for handling, transport, and  
inspections) is insufficient. As a result, assistance pro-
vided by international partners will often not lead to 
lasting change as the goods provided, whether they be 
storage facilities or training of individual servicemen, 
do not become part of the “fabric” of the organisation. 
Apart from concerns over staffing or financial 
means available, the current administrative limits also 
have a strong impact on the rate at which new or 
modified tasks can be incorporated into existing struc-
tures. Experience in state-building in South Sudan 
since 2005 has demonstrated how difficult it is to build 
genuine institutions from scratch. Adding many new 
responsibilities to weak institutions within a short 
period of time risks overburdening the system. It also 
diminishes the ability to learn from mistakes; an ex-
isting chance when time is not that much of an issue. 
South Sudan can be considered an extreme ex-
ample of a problem that all countries that have gone 
through prolonged periods of violence suffer from: 
They end up with weakened, or even perverted insti-
tutions that cannot, or can no longer, perform their 
basic tasks. This is particularly likely in cases where 
the standards are not necessarily engrained in the  
society that spawned these institutions, but were set 
by foreigners or at an international level. This makes 
the dilemma of PSSm, and arms control in general, so 
much more poignant: Countries that need proper 
arms control the most are also the ones where lasting 
change is most difficult to accomplish. 
The conflict has deteriorated  
an already difficult situation
Government control over arms has been weak, 
with the different security services only having an 
incomplete picture of the number of guns in use, 
their condition, and their geographical distribution 
across the country. The problem has persisted for a 
long time, dating back to the origins of the different 
components of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA) as rebel militias. It is caused to a large extent 
by the limited linkages between units in the field  
and central headquarters. There is also a general lack 
of centralised administrative systems that can con-
nect the details of individual service members (payroll 
information) to the weapon they have been issued,  
or are licensed to carry. with the outbreak of the war 
many youths were recruited into both the government 
army and rebel forces, and both sides have acquired 
or handed out large stocks of small arms and ammu-
nition. many stores, insofar as they existed, have been 
destroyed or plundered. Realistically, for each security 
service, a new system for the registration of weapons 
will have to be re-built from the ground.
PSSM is about making security forces 
better at what they do
As stated above, motivations for the government 
and international partners to strengthen PSSm prac-
tices can vary considerably. Nevertheless, all attempts 
to reinforce certain practices and approaches within 
the security forces have one thing in common: They 
want to make a security service better at what it does. 
The real concern lies with what this objective is, and 
how legitimate it is. In principle the objectives of the 
security forces, both stated and implicit, should involve 
such things as defending and controlling territory, 
protecting citizens, keeping criminals off the streets, 
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or protecting the country’s wildlife. All of that has to 
happen in a transparent and equitable manner, under 
close scrutiny from a country’s civilian institutions. 
The collapse of the armed forces in South Sudan 
has demonstrated that the different factions within 
the security services (a coalition of loosely integrated 
rebel groups) have very different aspirations, including 
securing the power of a number of individuals, ad-
vancing the interest of particular ethnic groups, or 
bringing wealth and status to its members. Changing 
this is first and foremost the responsibility of the 
government of South Sudan, and making judgment 
calls on morality should not be left to foreigners. 
However, this does not absolve South Sudan’s interna-
tional partners from at least thoroughly scrutinising 
their counterparts’ intentions and assessing whether 
their project to better secure, safeguard and control 
government arms and ammunition contributes to-
wards the “right” objective: making South Sudan a 
safer and more secure place to live in.
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On 5 march 2014 fighting over pay broke out in 
the South Sudanese capital Juba between different 
elements of the national army. mortars were launched 
and an ammunition depot caught fire. Following a 
few weeks of relative calm it was a stark reminder of 
just how fragile the situation had become. The inci-
dent took place against the backdrop of a conflict that 
started in December 2013 as political infighting but 
that quickly evolved into a prolonged rebellion with 
ethnic overtones. The depot burned throughout the 
night, exacerbating already strong feelings of anxiety 
regarding the stability of the armed forces that were 
supposed to protect the capital from an invasion by 
rebel troops. Over the next few days the government 
handed weapons out to soldiers and even civilians in 
Juba to assist them in quelling what they have consist-
ently labeled as a “failed coup attempt.” By the end of 
march, the government had to organise house searches 
to recover some of the weapons only to find—alleged-
ly to their own surprise—that many civilians had 
multiple “illegal” weapons stored, and some even had 
hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades lying 
on the floors of their houses. 
The recovery of lost or stolen government weapons 
during disarmament operations is unfortunately not 
an unfamiliar pattern in South Sudan. Accidents that 
occur as a result of badly stored explosive ordinance 
are far from the exception either. Tackling those risks 
falls under the umbrella of the physical security and 
stockpile management of arms and ammunition 
(PSSm). It encompasses small arms and light weapons 
(SALw) as well as conventional ammunition and can 
involve a wide range of interventions including the 
construction of weapons storage facilities, marking 
and registration of weapons, drafting of rules and reg-
ulations, training of army and police personnel in 
storage, handling, and transport of weapons and am-
munition, and the destruction of surplus. Good PSSm 
practices help increase security through better con-
trol over the weapons. They improve safety by making 
sure explosives are stored, handled, and transported 
with care. And they strengthen accountability by allow-
ing, in case of abuse, individual weapons to be traced 
back to individual soldiers or police officers.
Funded by the German Federal Foreign Office, 
BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion) has 
been working with the government of the Republic of 
South Sudan (GRSS) since 2011 to improve PSSm prac-
tices and approaches, primarily by providing technical 
advice. This Working Paper will provide an outline  
of that project and evaluate its results, as well as  
describe the broader developments that took place in 
arms and ammunition management over the entire 
length of the project period—roughly from 2011 until 
early 2014. A discussion of these developments allows 
for an evaluation that is of use to the larger commu-
nity engaged in improving weapons management, 
both in South Sudan and in other countries. 
The author of this Working Paper, a BICC technical 
advisor who was based in Juba within the Bureau  
for Community Security and Small Arms Control, the 
National Focal Point on small arms under the ministry 
of the Interior, supported the GRSS from 2012 to early 
2014. Although equipped with a limited budget for 
some activities, which included a number of trainings 
at the provincial (‘‘State”) level, the main task of the 
advisor consisted of assisting the South Sudanese  
authorities in their efforts to improve their arms and 
ammunition management.
This Working Paper is divided into four chapters. 
After  an introduction of the main findings the second 
chapter describes the political and security situation 
in South Sudan, with a focus on the problem of SALw 
proliferation and the institutional arrangements  
in place to tackle the problem. It is followed by a  
description of the BICC project, as well as the efforts 
by the GRSS and other international partners to  
improve the situation. The third chapter analyses 
project results and the operating environment. The  
Paper ends with a number of concluding remarks.
In his Working Paper, the author argues that the 
GRSS is increasingly aware of the importance of good 
PSSm, but that sustainable progress has not yet been 
made. Confusion over the appropriate institutional set- 
up for arms management—including the attribution 
of responsibility—within the government hampers 
concerted and targeted efforts to implement PSSm 
projects. This makes it more difficult for the GRSS to 
identify priorities for arms control and to submit 
these to its international partners for consideration 
and discussion.
Introduction
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Here a preliminary remark with regard to the 
current situation is warranted. This evaluation is 
based on the efforts and activities undertaken until 
December 2013. The outbreak of hostilities in late 2013 
put into serious doubt the results of all projects that 
aimed to improve the GRSS’ practices in arms and 
ammunition management. At the time of writing it is 
unclear what South Sudan’s future prospects for 
peace and stability are, or how the country can recover 
from the ethnic divide that has manifested itself 
during the conflict. The mass defection of entire army 
brigades that characterised the first phase of the  
rebellion in particular has brought into the open the 
extent to which internal cohesion, and command 
and control have been key weaknesses of the South 
Sudanese armed forces. Other organised forces, includ-
ing the police and wildlife service, have also suffered 
from defections but to a lesser degree. Any future effort 
to better control, safeguard, and account for arms  
and ammunition will only be a more complicated en-
deavour for it. 
Arms proliferation in South Sudan
Proliferation and disarmament
The presence of SALw is a pervasive problem in 
South Sudan and a result of the protracted civil war 
that pitched the government of Sudan against the  
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The war cost 
countless lives before finally leading to the establish-
ment of the independent Republic of South Sudan as 
the world’s youngest nation on 9 July 2011. Although 
in the west the war was popularly portrayed as a 
struggle of Christian–Animist “African” Southerners 
against oppressive muslim Arabs in the North, the 
war also set a large number of Southern militias and 
warlords up against each other. Some of those were 
used as proxy fighters by the Sudanese government in 
Khartoum to suppress the independence movement. 
Individual leaders’ political influence and wealth 
were in most cases more important drivers of conflict 
rather than of ideological differences. whereas the 
militias received weapons from Khartoum, the SPLA 
obtained them from neighbouring countries, mostly 
Ethiopia. Small arms from ex-Soviet stocks, particu-
larly the ubiquitous AK and its variants, were not in 
short supply, although ammunition tended to be 
harder to  obtain. The result was a country awash 
with guns. 
The government, and in particular the South  
Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), has been strug-
gling to provide security in rural areas. This role is 
frequently still taken up by local youth, particularly 
in the most volatile states of the country, such as 
Jonglei, Lakes, warrap, and Unity State. SALw are often 
labelled “multipliers of violence”, but that hides a 
more pervasive effect they have had on South Sudanese 
society. Over the course of the civil war and the post 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)-years, they 
have become embedded in rural culture, not merely as 
a means of violence but as an intrinsic component  
of a young man’s transition to adulthood. This is par-
ticularly the case amongst pastoralist groups where 
the youth carry guns in the cattle camps to protect 
their livestock, but also to raid cows from other ethnic 
groups. Apart from carrying immense symbolic value, 
cows are the currency of choice to pay dowries and 
over the years, prices have fallen victim to inflation. 
As a result cattle raiding has become almost a neces-
sity for youth who want to find a suitable wife. The 
practice has also increased in notoriety as the use of 
automatic rifles has made the number of fatalities 
rise, and as the raids now sometimes also target 
women and children to increase the raiding party’s 
population through forced marriage and adoption. 
Retaliatory raids aim to recover stolen cattle set off  
a cycle of revenge attacks that is very difficult to stop. 
Cattle raiding youth have proven to be a fertile con-
stituency for recruitment into different ethnic- 
based militia groups. membership of these groups is 
often fluid, depending on what the youth can get  
out of it in terms of access to arms, cattle, or other 
resources, including political power. 
The situation leads to a dilemma: The same youth 
responsible for cattle raiding are also those who  
can make a credible claim of providing protection to 
their own communities. The SSNPS lacks both the  
capacity in terms of manpower, equipment, and pro-
fessionalism, and the level of trust required to fully 
take over responsibility for local security structures. 
The GRSS has on numerous occasions tried to dis-
arm civilians, both through voluntary, civilian-led 
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processes, and through forceful disarmament; the 
latter usually carried out by the SPLA. In rural areas 
disarmament operations typically involved the SPLA 
surrounding villages, followed by door-to-door searches. 
The practice was often characterised by a lack of  
discipline and numerous human rights violations 
and resulted in a mistrust of the army that the civil-
ian population often perceived as biased against  
certain communities. In addition, because the SPLA 
was then unable or unwilling to provide the disarmed 
communities with protection, disarmed communities 
risked falling victim to cattle raids by neighbouring 
communities that had not (yet) been disarmed. Such 
occurrences only reinforced the perception amongst 
some communities that they were politically margin-
alised and would have to fend for themselves.
whether selective disarmament was an SPLA- 
wide policy is debatable. Instead of demonstrating an 
institution-wide commitment to targeting certain  
minorities, the process laid bare the extent to which 
the national army was unable to control units in the 
field from its headquarters in Juba. It is arguably just 
as likely that individual SPLA units and field com-
manders displayed an ethnic bias. This is lent credence 
by numerous stories about soldiers and high-ranking 
officers who handed out guns confiscated during  
disarmament campaigns to members of their own 
ethnic group. The result was a worst case scenario:  
a rural population again in possession of its firearms, 
but now with a heightened sense of distrust of the 
government because it had tried to take away the pri-
mary means of defence against that population’s 
neighbours and the government itself.
Controlling government arms 
Lack of government control is not restricted to 
weapons confiscated during disarmament campaigns. 
It is a well-known phenomenon in South Sudan that 
government weapons are stolen from official depots or 
are lost. In the absence of safe storage inside police 
stations, officers are forced to take their weapon home 
with them, leaving these vulnerable to mishandling 
or accidental discharges by others in the officers’ 
homes. It is often difficult to find out whether a 
weapon is lost or stolen as records are inadequate,  
incomplete, and not subject to regular audits.  
Stories of police officers “renting out” their weapon 
for the night also abound. Accountability for the loss 
of weapons or ammunition is minimal. 
Control over ammunition, particularly the storage 
and handling of items containing explosive material, 
is not up to even the most basic international stand-
ards. This is mostly a concern for the SPLA that owns 
the majority of this kind of materiel and that is nor-
mally in charge of military operations that would  
require the use of items like mortars, tank grenades, 
and rockets. Storage facilities suffer from a number of 
common deficiencies: In many cases they are not  
designed for storing explosive material; different kinds 
of explosives that ought not to be mixed are stored  
together; and conditions inside stores (such as high 
temperatures, presence of rodents, and atmospheric 
humidity) increase the risk of unintended explosions. 
A combination of these factors leads to a high risk  
of accidents with potentially large-scale loss of life as a 
result. It also diminishes the lifespan of ammunition 
for operations, thereby reducing operational readiness 
and necessitating earlier replacement. In a country 
where already half the government budget is spent on 
the security forces, this is an unwelcome addition to  
a budget line that already crowds out expenditure on 
social services.
The adequate registration of weapons and proper 
storage facilities for weapons and ammunition are 
two central aspects of PSSm. Other essential elements 
include a clear legal and regulatory framework for  
all components of the arms and ammunition manage-
ment cycle, and a thorough training package for all 
personnel involved. From generals down to privates, 
all should at least have a minimal understanding of 
the importance of sound arms and ammunition 
management. All these components are interlinked 
and mutually reinforcing. 
At all levels South Sudan is not yet able to adhere 
to international standards. SPLA officers frequently  
report that during the liberation struggle PSSm prac-
tices within the SPLA were in fact quite stringent.  
Allegedly this was born out of sheer necessity as  
especially in the early days of the struggle weapons 
and ammunition in particular were hard to come by 
and had to be looked after. These practices later be-
came diluted when, as part of the CPA and later the 
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Juba Declaration, numerous rebelling commanders and 
their militias were integrated into the movement. The 
new members did not live up to the same standards 
of security and accountability. Practices and skills  
acquired during the civil war were gradually lost or 
became too dispersed to be of systematic use as  
reliable standards across the movement.
Regulatory framework
The regulatory framework for PSSm in South Sudan 
is far from coherent. This has as much to do with the 
different objectives PSSm tries to achieve, as with the 
nascent state of South Sudan’s laws and institutions. 
As outlined above, the various objectives PSSm aims to 
achieve range from increasing community security and 
trust in local security providers to improving safety 
and operational readiness of the armed forces. These 
policies and actions generally fall under the authority 
of a number of different institutions and require a 
regulatory framework that works at different levels of 
abstraction. 
Generally speaking, a national arms and ammuni-
tion policy and legislation will provide the regulatory 
framework for all other activities employed under the 
PSSm umbrella. A policy describes at the most general 
level the aims a government has with regard to a certain 
topic. The policy is subsequently developed into legis-
lation. whereas the policy is a description of govern-
ment aims that is merely politically binding, legisla-
tion turns this into mandatory minimum requirements 
that are often backed up by provisions in the penal 
code. The political aims of having for example a gun-
free society, or of regulating hunting practices, need to 
be circumscribed in legislation that makes the posses-
sion of firearms illegal or that requires individuals to 
apply for firearms licenses if they want to go hunting. 
Because legal provisions remain rather abstract, 
they require further specification in regulations.  
Legislation normally requires ratification by parlia-
ment but regulations can be signed into effect by the 
designated official; usually the minister responsible. 
This facilitates their adjustment to new or changing 
circumstances over time. In the case of arms control, 
regulations for example can specify the exact proce-
dure individuals must follow when acquiring a licence, 
or they can prescribe the fees that have to be paid. 
The greatest level of detail is provided for in the 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) or standing or-
ders within the different organised forces (wildlife, 
prisons, etc.). These, for example, specify the emer-
gency procedures for an individual weapons storage 
site, or detail the administrative procedures that an 
officer has to go through in order to accept an appli-
cation for a hunting license. It is up to the respective 
part of the armed forces to then implement and en-
force the provisions of the SOPs. 
Responsible institutions
In South Sudan, developing policies on small arms 
and light weapons (SALw) control was initially part  
of the mandate of the National Disarmament, Demo-
bilisation, and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC). 
This authority was shifted in 2008 to a newly created 
institution, the South Sudan Bureau for Community 
Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC). Its estab-
lishment was partly down to dissatisfaction within 
some parts of the international community with the 
Commission that, already burdened with a difficult 
mandate, did not sufficiently prioritise arms control 
and community security. The establishment of BCSSAC 
was also very much in line with a number of inter-
national treaties and protocols that call for the creation 
of dedicated, civilian-led institutions to address issues 
of small arms control—chiefly the UN Programme of 
Action on Small Arms (PoA).
BCSSAC was originally part of the Office of the 
vice-President, but was later transferred to the minis-
try of Interior at the request of the then minister of 
Interior. It is responsible for policy development and 
the co-ordination of activities in the field of SALw 
control and community security. Under its auspices 
the SALw Control Policy was enacted in 2011. Its pri-
orities were the regulation of firearms transfers across 
the borders, the prevention of licit stocks becoming 
illicit, and removing from society the existing stock of 
illicit firearms. Even though BCSSAC maintains that 
the entire spectrum of PSSm activities fall within its 
mandate and authority, its main activities primarily 
relate to issues of community security and safety.
BCSSAC is the co-ordinating body for the drafting 
process of the SALw Control Bill, for which in 2012 a 
committee under the minister of Interior was 
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constituted. South Sudan is a signatory of the Nairobi 
Protocol on Small Arms Control (Nairobi Protocol)—
an agreement between states in the East-African re-
gion that aims to curb the proliferation of small arms. 
The SALw Control Bill would translate the provisions 
of the Nairobi Protocol into South Sudanese law. In 
late 2012 the Bill was submitted to the ministry of  
Justice for review by a technical committee that would 
look into the compatibility of the Bill with the national 
body of laws. By the time of writing (July 2014) that 
process had not been finalised and the Bill still awaited 
ratification. In the meantime, the same committee in 
charge of drafting the legislation has started working 
on the regulations. The rationale is that this decreases 
the time lapse between the Bill coming into force  
and the finalisation of the regulations. The process of 
drafting the regulations has been put on hold as the 
result of the outbreak of hostilities in December 2013. 
Developing SOPs for arms and ammunition man-
agement will be the responsibility of the individual 
organised forces. Apart from the SPLA and the South 
Sudan national police service (SSNPS), these are the 
wildlife service, the prison service, the national security 
service, and the fire brigade. They are tasked with  
taking care of the weapons on a day-to-day basis. This 
means that at least in principle, there is a clear insti-
tutional divide between formulating national policy 
and legislation (BCSSAC) and the implementation and 
enforcement of the rules (organised forces). with such 
a dichotomy in place, regular meetings and co- 
ordination of activities between the policy-setting 
body and those implementing it is of paramount  
importance and could in principle help to avoid dis-
cussions about the role and responsibilities of the 
different institutions involved. 
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2011: Assessment phase
BICC has been working with the NDDRC since 
2007. As a result of that collaboration it received a re-
quest from BCSSAC to assess of the state of arms  
and ammunition management of government- owned 
weapons in South Sudan. Funded by the German  
Federal Foreign Office a BICC technical advisor under-
took the assessment in 2011. The main findings of  
the study were that: 
   \ Safe storage is rudimentary in the Republic of 
South Sudan, and infrastructure as well as 
technical capacity to securely store or manage 
the inventory of SALw/ ammunition is lacking.
   \ If stores are available, these are often unsecured 
mud huts (tukuls), old infrastructure such as 
unused schools/ hospitals, or other concrete 
facilities and metal sheet huts which are not 
secure to store arms and ammunition. marine 
cargo containers are used as bulk storage facili-
ties mostly without any ventilation holes or sun 
protection. There is a high risk of unintended 
explosions. 
   \ The situation outside of Juba (at the county level 
and below) is dire. High hazard class ammuni-
tion is often accessible to the public, remains 
unprotected and unguarded. In some cases they 
are left scattered on the ground. 
   \ Racks or equipment for organising storage and 
ensuring that small arms are secure were not 
found anywhere. The general security of storage 
facilities, such as permitting entry and access 
to the stores of weapons and ammunition only 
to official personnel, is often insufficient and 
needs upgrading. In some cases new facilities 
will be required.  
   \ There is a general lack of safe storage guidelines.
   \ None of the security services had independent 
authorities charged with the oversight of SALw 
and ammunition stocks.
2012: Raising awareness
The assessment was followed by an official request 
from BCSSAC to the German Federal Foreign Office  
to provide advisory services through BICC for PSSm. 
As a result, in 2012 a technical advisor spent roughly 
six months working with BCSSAC in Juba to assist 
the government in making a start with the develop-
ment of a PSSm programme. Over the course of 2012 
BICC spent most of its time raising awareness with 
key government counterparts in BCSSAC, SPLA, SSNPS 
and other organised forces of the benefits of sound 
arms and ammunition management, as well as on the 
concrete steps the forces could take to improve their 
current practices. The technical advisor worked on a 
day-to-day basis with the co-ordinator for PSSm in 
BCSSAC to strengthen capacity at both the individual 
and the institutional level.
One of the most visible steps taken in 2012 was 
the establishment of an interagency arms and am-
munition management working group, consisting of 
an appointed focal point from each service at the  
level of a colonel or lieutenant-colonel. The idea was 
that at this rank officers would be able to play a cen-
tral role within their service, linking up the technical 
level in charge of store management with the senior 
level responsible for policy development and budget 
allocation. The working group’s main task was to 
co-ordinate efforts to improve PSSm and to report on 
activities taking place. In addition it would provide  
a useful forum for government representatives and 
international partners to interact, exchange ideas, 
and develop proposals for PSSm interventions.
Through the working group, BCSSAC and BICC  
focused their attention on getting the organised forces 
to implement so-called low cost, high value measures: 
small-scale interventions that are relatively cheap but 
that would still greatly increase the safety and security 
of the stores. Concrete examples include installing a 
new door, drilling ventilation holes, or using a stand-
ard register for the registration of weapons. 
This strategy was dictated by the political– 
economic circumstances prevalent in the country. In 
early 2012 the government of the Republic of South 
Sudan (GRSS) decided to shut down its oil exports 
through Sudan in response to what it deemed an illegal 
seizure of the country’s natural riches by its Northern 
neighbour. with 98 per cent of the government budget 
coming from oil revenues, the country was effectively 
dependent on its remaining foreign exchange, donor 
funding, and high-interest loans. Civil servants’ salaries 
The BICC project
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were still paid but over time operational budgets effec-
tively came down to zero—particularly those that 
were not yet appropriated. As a result the message that 
prevention is cheaper than a cure became a moot 
point as there was simply no money to prevent any-
thing other than a revolt by unpaid soldiers. 
Apart from BICC not many international partners 
were active in PSSm in 2012. The United Nations De-
velopment Programme (UNDP) was BCSSAC’s strongest 
supporter through its community security project, 
which included a strong capacity-building component 
for BCSSAC. Earlier on some small arms had been de-
stroyed, but these were mostly one-off events based on 
relations between demining non-government organi-
sations (NGOs) and local commanders. Saferworld, and 
UNDP to a lesser extent, provided financial assistance 
to the drafting committee for the legislation that also 
received support from a Saferworld consultant and ben-
efitted from advice from BICC and the security sector 
reform (SSR) unit of the United Nations mission in the 
Republic of South Sudan (UNmISS). UNmISS DDR pro-
vided the SPLA Engineering Corps with modified con-
tainers for the storage of small arms as a pilot project.
In 2012 UNmISS DDR started a project to acquire 
marking and registration equipment for small arms. 
The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), the body 
overseeing and providing assistance for the implemen-
tation of the Nairobi Protocol, had already provided 
BCSSAC with marking equipment in 2010. Roughly 
37,000 weapons were marked from SSNPS, wildlife 
service, prison service, and the fire brigade. However, 
incomplete registration, a limited linkage of weapons 
to individuals or storage sites, and the storage of 
data at BCSSAC instead of at the level of the services 
meant that it was impossible to trace these weapons 
based on their markings. Consequently the database 
was neither expanded nor updated. The RECSA project 
effectively came to a halt in 2012. UNmISS DDR then 
issued a tender for new marking and registration 
equipment. It was won by two South African compa-
nies: FACTT (software), and Traceability Solutions 
(machines) who had gained experience in marking 
in South Africa and the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC).
2013: Growing interest in PSSM
In 2013 BICC’s presence in South Sudan was in-
tensified, with a technical advisor permanently pres-
ent within BCSSAC. This made it possible to participate 
regularly in the meetings of the drafting committee 
for the regulations and to be more involved with the 
marking and registration process. The project shifted 
focus so that there was more frequent engagement 
with the Focal Points in the organised forces. 
Around early 2013 interest from other interna-
tional partners in PSSm increased. The UN mine  
Action Service commissioned three pilot projects for 
building or upgrading storage sites for the South  
Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) and the SPLA, 
executed by mines Advisory Group, Danish Demining 
Group, and Norwegian Peoples Aid. The rationale was 
that a successful implementation of these projects 
would create greater donor interest for PSSm in the 
face of less funds available for humanitarian mine 
action. BICC provided technical advice to these pro-
jects and on a number of occasions assisted the im-
plementing agencies to get in touch with govern-
ment counterparts. 
In mid-2013 UNmISS organised a study tour to 
South Africa in order to help officers responsible for 
arms management within the different organised 
forces gain a better understanding of what a function-
ing marking and registration system would look like. 
The trip was also used to discuss customisation of the 
database. The first batch of operators of the machines 
was trained in Juba in November, with handover of 
the machines still pending when fighting broke out 
in December 2013. Although the software design  
differs from the RECSA software that had by then  
become operational, it does capture the same basic 
information and allows for exchanges of information 
with other RECSA member states. 
Over the course of the project period, BICC en-
countered a number of persistent problems with the 
way arms and ammunitions were managed. In both 
SPLA and SSNPS, there is little systematic knowledge 
at both headquarter and state level about the number, 
type, and condition of arms and ammunition present 
in stores across the country. Central control over their 
strategic distribution is limited, and this in turn 
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greatly impedes the strategic lifecycle management 
of arms and ammunition and a corresponding acqui-
sition programme to make best use of what is 
available. 
A side-effect of this weak inventory management 
system is that no weapons are ever determined to  
be surplus to requirements or even obsolete. Although 
the GRSS has a policy for destroying weapons, that 
policy is so cumbersome and involves so many senior 
officers that in reality destruction in accordance with 
the established procedures is impossible—a legacy of 
the liberation struggle, during which weapons and 
ammunition were prized assets. As a result, there is 
neither a clear indication of the number of weapons 
the government requires (based on a strategic defence 
posture), nor of the number of weapons already avail-
able. This means that there is no data that can help 
counter the frequently heard argument that it could 
never hurt to hold on to the old rifles lying in a  
corner—just in case. when the conflict broke out in 
December 2013, arms purchases quickly became a 
government priority. Again, there were no means of 
telling whether this was based on a real or perceived 
lack of functioning guns already available and, if so, 
what the exact requirements were.
The majority of weapon stores in South Sudan 
contain guns that are inoperable. Their conditions 
range from those that just need minor repairs to 
completely rusted-through and outdated rifles for 
which neither the expertise to handle them, nor the 
corresponding ammunition is available. They occupy 
already limited storage space and are a hazard to any-
one who would try to use them. This is particularly 
dangerous in the case of rusty hand grenades or 
moisture-filled mortars that frequently pile up inside 
inadequate stores. Public incineration, particularly  
of the weapons, will not only increase security, it can 
also send a strong signal to the community that the 
government is taking small arms control seriously 
and is willing to start with its own stock. 
within the police and the army, the potential  
lethality of their sizeable caches of weapons and the 
significant value these represent is not reflected in 
manpower allocated, as expressed in the number of 
officers responsible for co-ordinating weapon storage, 
handling, and transport. This is not to say that the 
organised forces do not think that improving the 
management of weapons would be in the interest of 
their force and the country. with support from BICC, 
the SPLA and SSNPS have developed ideas to restructure 
the administrative structures for arms so that these 
better reflect a) the changed nature of the service 
(from rebel group to professional force) and b) the 
added responsibilities that needed to be introduced 
with, for example, a new curriculum or a comprehen-
sive weapons marking and registration system. Dis-
cussions between BICC and the SPLA and SSNPS had 
been at an advanced stage, and a concept paper, a 
draft organisational chart, and revised job descriptions 
had been ready to be sent to the police and army  
leadership. As with other developments in PSSm, this 
discussion was put on hold following the eruption  
of violence in the country.
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The outbreak of hostilities in South Sudan has 
laid bare many of the structural problems that the 
country faces, not only with regard to arms control. 
what started as a political dispute in Juba quickly  
escalated into large-scale conflict that was fought by 
renegade soldiers and youth militias who had easy 
access to small arms from badly secured arms depots 
and weapons that were registered nowhere. weak 
command and control, loyalty to commanders instead 
of to the army as an institution, and a strong ethnic 
dimension all combined, turned the conflict into 
something incredibly hard to contain. In the process, 
the fighting tore away any veneer of respectability 
and institutional coherence that the GRSS and the or-
ganised forces had been able to build up since 2005.
PSSm is a relatively new field of intervention, and 
in South Sudan it had barely taken off when the first 
shots were fired in Juba. The current situation has led 
to a forced suspension of most activities already un-
derway, making it an opportune moment to reflect on 
the way forward and what could be improved upon.
This chapter discusses a number of the key points 
faced by those working to counter the proliferation  
of small arms and improve PSSm in South Sudan, both 
within and outside of the government. The three 
most important points are: 
   \ the kind of arms control that is needed in 
South Sudan, 
   \ the expectations of the institutions involved,
   \ the more conceptual problem with regard to 
the possible objective of PSSm interventions.
The following discussion of these points can only 
be brief here and each one deserves (and sometimes 
has received) separate discussion that remains outside 
the remit of this evaluation. All three are grounded  
in South Sudanese history, and there are interests that 
need to be taken into account and different percep-
tions of what works or what constitutes success. As 
such they will continue to play a role in future 
interventions. 
Despite billions of dollars of international assis-
tance, there remains a large gap between what should 
change in South Sudan and what is possible given the 
current power constellations, the economic situation 
and the country’s social and cultural fabric. This is 
true even for the relatively “technical” field of PSSm. 
The necessity of having to improve arms management 
is based on the basic premise that there is a deficiency 
in the way a government enforces its monopoly of  
violence. The situation will only sustainably improve 
if there is a change in the structural reasons for why 
individuals behave in a way that threatens safety and 
security. when weapons are lost it makes all the dif-
ference for the sort of intervention required to find 
out whether the loss is due to generally weak infra-
structure, lack of training, or low pay. Interventions 
need to be targeted to individual and group moti-
vations, which is why PSSm is, and must be, executed 
as more than a collection of purely technical tasks. 
The motivations host governments have for 
agreeing on externally co-ordinated or funded PSSm 
programmes can also differ significantly from the 
ones held by their international partners. Nevertheless, 
diverging motivations can often find congruence in 
project-specific objectives. Government and donors 
will need to find a way to work together to achieve 
these goals, while remaining conscious of what each 
partner’s motives are. 
Which guns to control, and whose?
In South Sudan, the limited degree of physical 
control that central authorities have historically  
exercised over a large predominantly rural part of the 
country has implications for the kind of authority  
the government can aspire to establish. The SSNPS  
has so far not been able to keep many communities 
safe or to prevent inter-ethnic cattle raiding from  
spiralling out of control. In the latter case, the SPLA 
has often been called upon to restore order, further 
blurring the lines between law enforcement and the 
armed forces. 
This situation has surprisingly enough not led to 
any serious debate on the conditions under which 
the possession of firearms for self-protection is an  
acceptable situation. For the moment, small arms 
control remains based on the premise that the pos-
session of most types of weapons is reserved for rep-
resentatives of the state, and that being granted a  
licence to own a firearm is a form of government 
permission, not the exercise of a right. In order to 
obtain such a licence, the applicant will have to 
Challenges to be addressed
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undergo training with a government-accredited 
trainer, submit proof of safe storage, and pay the  
prescribed fees in order to obtain a one-year licence. 
After that year he will have to go through the  
process again.  
All of these conditions are a significant burden for  
anyone living in a remote part of the country with  
limited financial means. 
In addition, as the possession of an automatic 
firearm is reserved to members of the organised forces, 
citizens are only allowed to apply for a licence to 
possess either a semi-automatic or a non-self loading 
weapon. From a conceptual point this is understand-
able, if only because it is an intrinsic part of a model 
followed by all countries in the region. However, in the 
absence of a comprehensive disarmament of compet-
ing tribes and a government stepping in to fill the 
void, many South Sudanese will continue to feel the 
need to carry a gun. A blanket ban on the possession 
of automatic weapons will not only be hard to enforce, 
it will leave even people who have a genuine need for 
a weapon to defend themselves with a dilemma. 
Non-automatic alternatives to the ubiquitous AK47, 
such as bolt-action rifles or semi-automatic hand-
guns, are expensive, hard to come by, and do not offer 
the kind of firepower some individuals might feel 
they require as long as the state is not able to guaran-
tee their safety.
Those without a permit are in violation of the law, 
and despite more community-oriented sensitisation 
programmes on the dangers of gun use such as the 
BCSSAC / UNDP ‘Peace Caravan’, the dominant rhetoric 
within the GRSS remains that small arms control  
involves taking away guns from civilians. 
Although it is understandable that the govern-
ment wants to exercise control over its territory, the 
objective of arms control efforts should be the security 
of the citizens, not securing the capacity of the gov-
ernment to use unrestrained force when this suits its 
interest. Even if security can be guaranteed, civilian 
disarmament should not proceed without a compre-
hensive plan in place for the marking, registration, 
and safe storage of any weapon confiscated. The rele-
vant authorities must take a decision in advance as  
to what will happen to confiscated weapons, both  
serviceable and unserviceable, to avoid that local 
communities try to get their guns back. The fact that 
this has happened in the past only underscores the 
close link between PSSm and civilian arms control. 
without curbing the demand for guns in the 
communities, pressure on government stockpiles  
will remain. PSSm initiatives will be all the more diffi-
cult for it. Amidst discussions on the sort of civilian 
weapons control the government should exercise, 
control of government-owned arms can also play an 
important symbolic role. By better securing and  
accounting for its own weapons and reducing leakages 
from government stocks, the government can demon-
strate that weapons safety and security is a genuine 
priority and that it is willing to take up its own respon-
sibilities first.
Institutional strength  
and realistic expectations
The weakness of government institutions are a 
challenge that donors quickly identified as one of the 
ills of the world’s youngest nation. Immediately after 
the signing of the CPA in 2005, large numbers of tech-
nical advisors started working to build the capacity  
of all the newly founded line ministries, courts, local 
government institutions, the central bank, and the 
organised forces. Given the short time lapse, rocky 
past, and the economic and political difficulties the 
country has already faced in its two years since inde-
pendence, it is hardly surprising these are not yet up 
to the standards outlined in international best prac-
tice guidelines. 
In the field of SALw control the institutional 
weakness of BCSSAC has had a strong impact on its 
ability to steer policymaking on arms control in South 
Sudan. This was partially due to disputes over leader-
ship and internal management, but these have evi-
dently been compounded by broader issues of political 
will, both with regard to the institution’s mandate 
and its institutional placement. The institution’s posi-
tion as a semi-independent body under the ministry 
of Interior but physically separated from the ministry 
premises means that it has less direct access to the 
top level of government than, for example, the numer-
ous independent government commissions whose 
commissioners are considered (junior) cabinet 
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members. most staff members are acutely aware that 
this makes BCSSAC’s access to the highest level of 
government precarious and dependent on individual 
connections—even though informal networks are  
admittedly important throughout the South Sudanese 
administrative system.
The real problem lies not so much with the insti-
tutional weakness of the existing body but with  
the lack of genuine interest and will within the upper 
echelons of government (at the level of the minister 
and the presidency) to provide BCSSAC with either the 
hierarchical positioning, the manpower, or the fi-
nancial means to implement its ambitious mandate. 
A number of examples make this apparent: After a  
reshuffle, no permanent Head of the institution has 
been appointed for over two years; the ministry of 
Justice failed to review the draft SALw Control Bill 
for over a year after it had lost its copy; and finally 
BCSSAC was transferred from the vice-President’s 
office to the ministry of Interior, and has now finally 
become the responsibility of the Deputy minister of 
Interior who is not a full cabinet member. In the 
minefield of competing priorities, capacity-building, 
and technical advice across the full range of govern-
ment activities, SALw control has unfortunately not 
received the unmitigated attention it requires and 
deserves. 
BCSSACs positioning within the government  
hierarchy has had an impact on its ability to co-ordinate 
PSSm activities throughout the country. whereas  
the institution is (at least nominally) responsible  
for policy drafting and co-ordination, genuine control 
over arms lies with the organised forces. Because  
BCSSAC itself falls under a different line ministry than 
the SPLA, it has no direct formal links to the army 
senior leadership. Implementation of BCSSAC policies 
by the SPLA is therefore not guaranteed, and buy-in 
has clearly been a problem. This was evident in the 
numerous unilateral disarmament campaigns con-
ducted by the SPLA, in which no civilian institutions, 
including BCSSAC, were genuinely involved. 
The problem also applies to the drafting commit-
tee for SALw legislation. Although the committee  
initially boasted the presence of a senior SSNPS gen-
eral, he gradually (unofficially) withdrew and became 
otherwise occupied. One of the consequences is that 
the drafting committee has decided that because 
stockpile management is part of the BCSSAC mandate, 
the committee can also lay down rules on ammunition 
management. It remains to be seen whether the uni-
formed services will accept the rather strict standards 
laid down for weapons and ammunition storage as 
part of a process in which no officers from the key 
logistics directorates have consistently been involved.
In all likelihood, this situation is not unique to 
South Sudan. The premise that a civilian body, situated 
outside of the chain of command, would be able to 
co-ordinate and take decisions on matters of logistics 
and procurement on behalf of the organised forces is 
wishful thinking in many countries where the military 
controls a preponderance of political (and often  
economic and social) capital. For such an institution 
to succeed, it must have direct access to and consistent 
support from the highest levels of power—including 
the military. 
The arms and ammunition management working 
group supported by BICC and co-ordinated by BCSSAC 
has been one attempt to bring the different govern-
ment institutions involved in PSSm closer together. 
However, the organised forces in South Sudan func-
tion in a particularly hierarchical manner that leaves 
little room for manoeuvre lower down the ranks. 
whereas for example in most armies around the world 
a full colonel is a high-ranking officer with autonomy 
and responsibility within his area of operations, South 
Sudan boasts no less than 745 generals (Brigadier- 
Generals and above)—making a colonel a compara-
tively less senior rank. This is why the Focal Points’ 
superiors (at the level of Brigadier and major-General) 
have been increasingly involved in the BICC project.
The skeleton regulatory framework the organised 
forces currently have in place shows that there is  
in fact much need for higher-level, policy-oriented in-
volvement. Focussing too much on the institutional 
weakness of BCSSAC risks glossing over the fact that 
the organised forces themselves currently lack the 
bureaucracy or administrative capacity to implement 
large-scale reforms required to, for instance, mark 
and electronically register their entire inventory. The 
numerous professionalisation initiatives that were 
started in collaboration with international partners 
and the numerous operational requirements took up 
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the majority of energy and resources that could have 
been dedicated to enacting change. 
Limited central control over arms and ammunition 
stored outside of Juba means that any intervention 
aimed at setting national standards will face serious 
implementation problems. At headquarter level there 
is no overview of the state of stores (and thus of when 
stores need to be upgraded), and officers are regularly 
rotated without taking into account the specialised 
knowledge they have acquired through training pro-
grammes. At the same time, entirely decentralised  
interventions through the training of storekeepers and 
building of infrastructure will require buy-in from 
headquarters. This is not only to prevent central actors 
from feeling left out of the process, it is also because 
local interventions easily risk being one-off events. 
without regular inspections from a higher authority 
(be it at the national or the state level), the sustaina-
bility of PSSm interventions will be largely accidental 
and based on connections to individual commanders. 
In the long run, national regulations, included in 
every private and non-commissioned officer’s core 
training curriculum and backed up by a thorough  
accounting system, are required to elevate standards 
across the board. 
The problem of a limited administrative and  
bureaucratic capacity having to implement change 
points to a puzzling dichotomy: Everyone involved in 
the South Sudanese state-building project recognises 
the fact that it is a young nation with weak institu-
tions that need to be built from scratch. At the same 
time, there is little evidence that building those  
institutions or giving the existing ones new respon-
sibilities, is based on a realistic assessment of what 
they can currently achieve or how many additional 
tasks they would be able to absorb. The over-stretching 
of institutions with new tasks and the lack of a 
phased approach cannot be fixed by external technical 
advisors alone, as this creates over-reliance on for-
eigners and parallel structures of governance. The  
difficulties of capacity-building in a post-conflict  
environment are well-known and discussed exhaus-
tively, but the debate has not taken much hold in 
PSSm yet. 
BICC has experienced this difficulty when trying 
to engage government counterparts in discussions on 
low-cost measures, on drafting training curricula, or 
on reforming administrative structures. Particularly 
after it became clear that donors would potentially be 
interested in funding the construction of new stores,  
it became impossible to get attention for smaller, less 
visible measures. This was not merely a matter of  
disinterest, it was the result of a wider environment 
in which certain core government functions were  
effectively outsourced (both financially and techni-
cally) to outsiders. Even with regard to weapons  
control, a basic responsibility of the armed forces, a 
similar expectation existed that foreigners would 
build stores, train personnel, and help draft the re-
quired rules and regulations. At the same time, inter-
national partners, primarily demining NGOs, were 
asking the government to provide them with policies 
and a legislation that would allow them to start  
applying for donor funds. whether or not this was a 
realistic expectation was a question that was answered 
differently even within government, where different 
institutions and individuals oscillated between a lack 
of trust in their own capacities—often employing the 
metaphor of South Sudan as an infant that needed 
nursing—and a strong sense of pride, resulting in  
assertions that outsiders had no right to interfere with 
the government’s affairs. 
There is a degree to which strengthened internal 
GRSS co-ordination as well as improved co-ordination 
amongst donors, implementing partners, and the 
GRSS could ameliorate the situation. It could help to 
align government priorities, allocate responsibilities, 
and provide clarity regarding mutual expectations. 
The continued call for co-ordination has become louder, 
even though a high turnover rate at both sides of the 
table means there is little institutional memory in 
place that can guarantee that previously held debates 
are not repeated. BCSSAC has not been able to consis-
tently take upon itself this co-ordinating role in PSSm 
for reasons mentioned earlier, and BICC has therefore 
had difficulty finding an approach that would be able 
to strengthen co-ordination with all major stake-
holders (BCSSAC, the services, and international part-
ners) who are genuinely on board. 
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Defining the objective
As mentioned earlier, PSSm is a broad concept 
that can incorporate multiple types of interventions 
that each aim at different objectives. This ambiva-
lence is inherent in the concept of PSSm. It permits 
actors with different backgrounds and different insti-
tutional objectives to converge and jointly design a 
project that seems appealing to all those involved.
The risk is that because neither the GRSS nor  
the international community operate according to the 
strict hierarchical and policy-consistent formula 
known from western government bureaucracies, dif-
ferent interpretations of what a PSSm project tries  
to achieve will emerge. For some donors securing arms 
is a means to improve community security, whereas 
others aim at preventing terrorists from getting their 
hands on particularly lethal military equipment.  
For organisations with a background in humanitarian 
demining, focussing on ammunition safety may seem 
natural, whereas more development-focussed orga-
nisations might want to prevent armed violence  
between communities as it obstructs development 
efforts. 
The same difference in objectives is visible within 
government. BCSSAC might care more about the  
impact of SALw proliferation on community security, 
whereas for the SPLA controlling the territory and 
maintaining operational readiness is more of a con-
cern. This has become visible on numerous occasions 
when the more civilian-oriented institutions border-
ing the South Sudanese security sector (BCSSAC, DDR 
Commission, Peace Commission), despite large-scale 
backing from international donors, had to give way  
to interests exemplified by the army, national security, 
or individual interests over matters of peace and  
security. “Civilian-led” initiatives only remained 
civilian- led as long as their programmes and projects 
were compatible with the objectives of key figures  
in the politico-military centre.
Bypassing civilian institutions in favour of direct 
engagement with the security services may in prac-
tice lead to more “effective” interventions. However, 
such a policy will only reinforce the relatively mar-
ginal position of such institutions, even though their 
objectives are likely to be closer to the ones donors 
prioritise. It would also be an acknowledgement that 
the large-scale financial and technical donor support 
that these institutions received in the past has not 
been effective. Shifting to unencumbered support of 
the organised forces in PSSm will make some things 
easier but, as their recent partial disintegration has 
aptly demonstrated, many similar challenges remain.
Pointing out the difficulties involved in focussing 
energy on one institution instead of another is not a 
call for a “holistic” approach. There will not be an  
integrated, well-co-ordinated programme whereby 
government, donors, and implementing agencies  
get stores upgraded across the country, officers from 
all levels trained, national standards ratified and  
implemented, and full ammunition lifecycle manage-
ment put in place—thereby fulfilling everyone’s 
wishes. Such programmes require the exact kind of 
systematic approach and sustained political commit-
ment that key stakeholders in South Sudan cannot 
guarantee. In fact they should not, as this approach 
rarely leaves enough flexibility to quickly adjust to 
challenges encountered during early phases. A more 
incremental approach, whereby government and  
international partners engage in small-scale efforts, 
learn from mistakes and adapt to changing circum-
stances is more likely to foster the relations needed to 
succeed in a sensitive field like the control of nation-
ally owned arms. As BICC has experienced, building 
relations with the right people is crucial, even though 
for outsiders the internal machinations of South  
Sudanese politics are, and in most cases will remain, 
highly opaque. 
what this does call for is a re-think of what a PSSm 
project is supposed to achieve, and what the most  
effective use of resources available would be to achieve 
that objective. Sometimes this means tying in PSSm 
with efforts looking at community security or armed 
violence reduction. Some components are genuinely 
technical and involve knowledge from explosive ord-
nance disposal or munitions training. And some will 
require building governmental capacity and authority 
in a manner not dissimilar from security sector re-
form programmes. In all cases what is necessary is to 
understand why certain practices came into existence 
and what has caused the current situation. 
21 \ bicc \ Working paper  1 \ 2014
“Guns are for the Government” \ Luuk van de vondervoort
BICC has, through its support to the GRSS, been 
able to raise awareness on the importance of PSSm and 
increase interest amongst government actors and the 
international community. BICC deliberately chooses 
to leave only a small footprint as part of its advisory 
services. It operates with a minimum of staff, is with-
out its own office space, logistics, or finance personnel 
in-country and does not acquire fixed assets such as 
vehicles. Advisors are based within government insti-
tutions to which they provide technical advice and 
with which they work together to strengthen their 
capacity. This approach aims to make the role of BICC 
personnel strictly advisory, instead of implementers 
of a programme or project on behalf of a government. 
As a downside this means that the overall success  
or failure of a programme—in this case the degree to 
which arms and ammunition management has im-
proved in South Sudan—is dependent on a large array 
of factors that often fall outside of the advisor’s direct 
sphere of influence. 
The long-term impact of the project is currently 
in question and it is very doubtful whether sufficient 
political will exists for the country’s elite to imple-
ment broader political and societal changes that are 
required to move South Sudan forward after the deep 
divide caused by the violence. Future project on arms 
control require in any case an acknowledgement  
that the South Sudanese organised forces have only  
a rudimentary ability to manage their weapons, and 
that this capacity cannot be upgraded overnight.  
Simple programmes with modest aims might be better 
than more ambitious projects that not only require 
individuals to do many things differently, but also to 
do it within an organisation that is undergoing a 
complete overhaul.
Integrating all these different components at a 
smaller scale and in a relatively safe and stable environ-
ment (insofar as it currently exists) would be the  
ideal approach, as long as different actors focus on 
where they each can add value and clearly communi-
cate amongst each other—both of which are easier 
said than done. The training of storekeepers, the up-
grading and building of storage facilities for small 
arms should be backed up with establishing decentral-
ised systems for auditing weapons and ammunition 
registers, for example at the State level. The State-level 
Commissioner of Police can play a central role in 
keeping the system intact, including preventing need-
less transfers of trained personnel. Information on 
the condition of stores, the location of weapons, and 
the degree of implementation of rules and regulations 
can then be fed back to headquarters, at which level 
more engagement by the army and police leadership 
on the drafting of regulations and standard training 
curriculums is still required. BICC’s previous role in 
providing advice and raising awareness at the policy 
and senior level of the organised forces will remain 
relevant in this field.
The recent events in South Sudan also pose fun-
damental ethical questions. International standards 
on PSSm are rather technical, and the precise nature 
of many of its components will change very little 
whatever the political affiliation of the government 
or its general stance towards arms control may be. 
Nevertheless, its activities form a part of a profession-
alisation initiative of the organised forces, and as  
such aim to make them better at what they do. Expe-
rience in other countries has demonstrated that 
measures aimed at improving accountability and at 
intro ducing checks and balances can easily be dis-
carded if the organised forces perceive them as 
straight jackets or obstacles. The South Sudanese secu-
rity forces, both those loyal to the government and 
those in opposition, have been involved in killings of 
civilians, often based on tribal affiliation. 
Support to the South Sudanese armed forces 
should therefore not come without reservations. where 
exactly to draw the line between principled rejection 
and constructive re-engagement is difficult to say, but 
at the moment working with local police to improve 
arms control as a means to improve police-community 
relations makes more sense than improving ammu-
nition safety and operational capacity for the SPLA. 
External assistance on arms control is only warranted 
if it aims to reinforce the activities of a force that is 
dedicated to improving the lives of the people it is 
supposed to protect. This is BICC’s responsibility as 
well as any donor’s, and this precondition should 
have an impact on the kind of activities proposed and 
the partnerships struck. There still remains a lot of 
work to be done in small arms control in South Sudan, 
probably more than ever. 
Concluding remarks
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